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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 24 1987-1988 NUMBER 1
Interpreting RICO's "Pattern of Racketeering
Activity" Requirement After Sedima: Separate
Schemes, Episodes or Related Acts?
HAROLD SELAN*
INTRODUCTION
Until 1985, the term "pattern of racketeering activity" as used
in the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) was usually applied by simple reference to the RICO
statute where the term is defined as the commission of two or
more specified criminal acts within a ten year period of one an-
other.' As civil RICO grew in use and popularity during the
1980s, some courts began to view the task of judicially construing
the RICO statute as being similar to a "treasure hunt."2 Still, the
requirement of pleading and proving a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity remained relatively free from judicial scrutiny. That
changed in 1985 when the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co.,3 admonished both Congress and the lower courts for
their failure "to develop a meaningful concept of pattern. ' 4 Al-
though Sedima involved several important issues unrelated to the
interpretation of "pattern of racketeering activity," the present
significance of the decision is the continuing debate over the
meaning of Justice White's dicta that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" involves elements of "continuity plus relationship."'
* Associate, Morgan, Miller & Blair, Oakland, California. Admitted to practice in
California and New Hampshire. Graduate of Hastings College of Law (J.D., 1982); Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley (B.A., 1979 [Phi Beta Kappa]). Areas of speciality: complex
business and tort litigation. The writer wishes to acknowledge the support and encourage-
ment of Helena Jia Hershel, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Dartmouth College.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
2. Sutcliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984).
3. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
4. Id. at 500.
5. Id. at 496 n.14.
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For some courts, Sedima's dicta "create[d] a whole new ball
game ' which justified wholesale re-examination of the pattern re-
quirement. Other courts have analyzed Justice White's language
as dicta and have resisted the urge to engage in judicial activism
by rewriting RICO's statutory requirements. Consequently, a
broad spectrum of divergent interpretations reading the pattern
requirement has emerged since Sedima. Naturally, the impact of
such diverse, and often antagonistic, decisions has created confu-
sion both among those pleading civil RICO and courts ruling on
the perimeters of the racketeering statute.
Within this wide spectrum, three major theories have emerged.
At one end of this spectrum is a series of decisions first articulated
in the Northern District of Illinois, which restrict the interpreta-
tion of pattern as requiring a showing of separate fraudulent
criminal schemes as a prerequisite to RICO liability.7 At the
other end of the spectrum are courts which hold that a pattern is
adequately alleged when a plaintiff claims two or more connected
or related criminal acts listed in the RICO statute.8 These courts
have narrowly read Sedima and have tended to follow closely the
plain language of the RICO statute.9 Courts at this end of the
spectrum which have confronted the separate schemes analysis
have squarely rejected it as an attempt to eviscerate the RICO
statute by judicially grafting requirements on the statute unfore-
seen by Congress.' °
A middle approach has also evolved which, like the separate
scheme theory, goes beyond RICO's stated statutory definition of
pattern. However, unlike the proponents of the more restrictive
separate scheme theory, the adherents to this middle approach
recognize that a pattern of separate fraudulent episodes or trans-
actions occurring within a single fraudulent scheme can fulfill the
requirement of the RICO statute." Under this view, a number of
flexible, relevant factors are used to assist the court in making the
pattern determination. 12 The Seventh Circuit, summing up the
middle approach, admitted that interpreting the pattern of racke-
6. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 833
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
7. See infra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 67-95 and accompanying text.
9. RICO's statutory requirements are discussed at length infra notes 17-31 and
accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Volckmann v. Edwards, 642 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Brainerd
& Bridges v. Weingeroff Enters., Inc., No. 85-C-493, slip op. (N.D. I1l. Sept. 18, 1986).
But see Medallion Television Enter. v. Selec-TV, 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986),
affd, No. 86-5595, slip op. (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1987).
11. See, e.g., Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
12. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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teering activity requirement is no longer a matter of merely apply-
ing statutory language but rather involves the application of a le-
gal "standard":
The doctrinal requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is
a standard, not a rule, and as such its determination depends on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, with no one
factor being necessarily determinative."a
Courts using this middle analysis consider it a "flexible approach"
towards interpreting the statutory language. These courts envision
the definition and scope of what constitutes a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" developing as an evolving fact-oriented, case by
case standard. 14
The plethora of interpretations of RICO's "pattern of racke-
teering activity" language and the impact of Sedima's dicta has
developed into what one court has termed a "cottage industry."'"
Rather than contributing to that thriving industry, the purpose
here is to examine the spectrum of interpretations which have pro-
liferated since Sedima, and to provide some insight into the bene-
fits and deficiencies of each interpretation.
I. "PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY": THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS
The RICO statute16 authorizes a private civil action for treble
damages for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" by
a pattern of racketeering activity.17 Five elements of proof are
necessary to establish a violation: it must be shown that a "per-
son,""' through a "pattern of racketeering activity"'9 or collection
of an unlawful debt, directly or indirectly: (a) invested, or (b)
maintained an interest, or (c) participated in the conduct of, or
(d) conspired to do (a), (b), or (c); in an "enterprise,"20 the activi-
13. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1986).
14. See, e.g., Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 653 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (D.V.I.
1987); Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D. Md. 1986).
15. Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) defines "person" as "any individual or entity capa-
ble of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
19. A "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982)
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after [Oct. 15,
1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior
act of racketeering activity." (emphasis added).
20. An "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970). Any group, whether formal or informal, legal
or illegal, may be alleged as an enterprise so as long as the members are "associated in
fact." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581, 583 (1981) (emphasis added).
1988]
3
Selan: Interpreting RICO's "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Requiremen
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
4 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
ties of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, causing injury
to the plaintiff's "business or property by reason of' the RICO
violation.2'
The term "pattern" appears only once in the statute in the
phrase "pattern of racketeering activity," and is defined as requir-
ing at least two predicate acts of "racketeering activity" within
ten years of one another.2 2 "Racketeering activity" is defined as
certain "predicate acts" including any act or threat involving any
of eight specified state felonies or twenty-five specified federal of-
fenses including any act which is indictable under the federal
mail, wire and securities fraud statutes."3
The increasing use of civil RICO in recent years has been due,
in part, to the relative ease of including several of RICO's predi-
cate acts as part of a civil RICO count, particularly mail fraud,24
wire fraud, 25 and/or fraud in the sale of securities .2  The attrac-
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). That section states in full that:
"Racketeering Activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery or dealing in narcotics or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of Title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), sec-
tion 224 (relating to sports bribery), section 471, 472 and 473 (relating to counter-
feiting), Section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indicta-
ble under 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds), section 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions),
section 1089 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341
(relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relat-
ing to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of state or local
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local
law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery
or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to un-
lawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling business), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation
of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband ciga-
rettes), sections 2421-2424 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restric-
tions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected
with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufac-
ture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any state law of the United
;States;
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
26. Mail and wire fraud must be alleged with enough particularity to satisfy the
requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 9 and include the time, place and content of the fraud
as well as the person making the fraud and what was obtained or given as a result of the
fraud. See, e.g., Van Dorn Co. v. Howington, 623 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (N.D. Ohio 1985);
Cf. Banco de DeSarrollo Agropecuario v. Gibbs, 640 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(requiring allegations of two acts of racketeering activity with enough specificity to show
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tion of including these federal criminal acts as part of a civil
RICO action is appreciated when examining the apparent simplic-
ity of their criminal elements. For example, a mail or wire fraud
violation-and hence any derivative violation of the rights of a
RICO victim-requires two well-defined elements: (1) that the
defendant must have first devised a scheme or artifice to defraud,
and (2) they then used the mails or interstate wires to further the
scheme.17 A "scheme to defraud" has been interpreted as includ-
ing any deceptive scheme "contrary to public policy [which] con-
flicts with accepted standards of moral uprightness, fundamental
honesty, fair play and right dealing."'2  Use of the mails or inter-
state wires, the second element, need only be incidental to support
a violation of the federal wire or mail statutes.2 9 The invariable
presence of these enumerated acts in virtually any commercial
fraud scheme, along with the potential of treble damages, has cat-
apulted many "garden-variety" fraud actions into RICO lawsuits.
With such broad possible applications, federal courts have become
increasing hostile to civil RICO lawsuits, especially those employ-
ing the fraud predicate acts as the basis of the racketeering viola-
tion. One court put it simply that "if civil RICO is a cancer, the
inclusion of mail fraud as a predicate offense is the carcinogen."3
Up until the Supreme Court's Sedima decision in 1985, the
lower courts were focusing on several disparate elements of the
RICO statute in an effort to halt the judicial perception of an
over-expansion in the civil use of the statute. Some courts held
that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege a special "racketeering
type" injury separate and distinct from the injury naturally flow-
ing from the predicate acts themselves. 31 More aggressive courts
held that civil use of RICO demanded some sort of connection to
organized criminal or convicted criminal activity and required a
prior criminal conviction on the alleged predicate act as a prereq-
uisite for civil RICO actions." Still, no court had focused on re-
that there is probable cause the crimes were committed). But see Seville Indus. Mach.
Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1211 (1985).
27. Pereria v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); Cf. Virden v. Graphics One, 623
F. Supp. 1417, 1434 (E.D. Cal. 1985). Under the first element of these federal crimes it
must be established that the defendant had the specific intent to engage in the scheme or
artifice to defraud.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir. 1979).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504, 510 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 972 (1980).
30. Ghouth v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1334 n.10 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
31. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus. Inc., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir.
1984) and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. See Sedima, 741 F.2d 482, rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
1988]
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stricting the interpretation of the pattern requirement as a means
of curtailing the statute's growing use.
Prior to Sedima, the only significant controversy regarding the
interpretation of "pattern of racketeering activity" revolved
around the type of relationship necessary to be alleged between
the requisite predicate acts themselves in order to establish a pat-
tern. Some courts read the statutory definition of "pattern"--
which requires at least two predicate acts within ten years of one
another-literally and held that the predicate acts "need not be
related to each other but must be related to the affairs of the en-
terprise."' 3 Other courts required that the alleged racketeering
acts "must have been connected with each other by some common
scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not sim-
ply a series of disconnected acts. 3 4 Despite this minor interpretive
split, there was general unanimity rejecting any requirement that
separate or distinct criminal schemes or episodes be present to
allege pattern.3 5 This unanimity was shattered soon after the
lower courts began their new quest to interpret the meaning of
Sedima's dicta on the pattern issue. 6
II. THE Sedima DECISION
The Supreme Court in Sedima, suggested that "[t]he 'ex-
traordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be
primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in
particular the inclusion of wire, mail and securities fraud, and the
failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful con-
cept of 'pattern'. 37 Despite this admonition by the court, the con-
struction of the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" was not
an issue in Sedima.
Sedima involved a Belgian corporation, Sedima, entering into a
joint venture with Imrex Co., to provide component electronic
parts. The buyer was to order the component parts through
Sedima. Imrex was to obtain the parts in the United States and
ship them to Europe. The agreement called for the two corpora-
33. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902-03 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F.
Supp. 1061, 1066 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
34. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v.
Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afJ'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
35. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Starnes, 644 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
36. See Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 830
(N.D. III. 1985) discussed in detail infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
37. 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1979).
[Vol. 24
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tions to split the proceeds. Imrex filed approximately $8,000,000
in orders placed with it through Sedima. Sedima became con-
vinced that Imrex was presenting inflated bills, cheating Sedima
out of a portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent ex-
penses. Sedima sued, alleging along with its common law claims,
RICO violations predicated on acts involving both mail and wire
fraud. The Second Circuit in a decision which admittedly was
designed to drastically narrow the availability of civil RICO ac-
tions, upheld a district court dismissal on the basis that Sedima
failed to allege either that Imrex suffered a prior criminal convic-
tion of the predicate acts, or that Sedima suffered any "racketeer-
ing injury" distinct from the injury flowing from the alleged mail
or wire fraud violations.38
The Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision, holding
that the successful pleading of a civil RICO action required only
allegations of "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pat-
tern (4) of racketeering activity."3 The Court rejected any re-
quirement from within the statute or its legislative history of the
necessity of alleging either prior criminal convictions, special
"RICO-type" injury, or any connection with organized crime. 0
According to the majority, with RICO:
[C]ongress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
enterprises. [citations omitted]. The former enjoy neither an in-
herent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its
consequences. The fact that 1964(c) is used against respected
businessmen allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identi-
fiable criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming
that the provision is being misconstrued. . . . [T]he fact that
RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.41
Although the Sedima Court was not presented with the issue of
whether Sedima had adequately alleged a "pattern of racketeering
activity" against Imrex and the other member of the enterprise,
the Court admonished both Congress and lower courts for their
failure "to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern' [of racke-
teering activity]. '"42 The Court noted that this failure, along with
the relative ease that the predicate could be alleged, were primar-
ily responsible for the "extraordinary" uses of the civil RICO stat-
ute. 3 In what has become the critically discussed footnote 14 in
38. Sedima, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
40. Id. at 488-500.
41. Id. at 499.
42. Id. at 500.
43. Id.
1988]
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Sedima, Justice White, writing for the majority, noted:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a
"pattern of racketeering activity" differs from other provisions
in section 1961 in that it states that a pattern "requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity," section 1961(5) (emphasis
added) not that it "means" two such acts. The implication is
that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.
Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not generally
form a 'pattern'. The legislative history supports the view that
two isolated acts of racketeering do not constitute a pattern. As
the Senate Report explained: 'The target of [RICO] is thus not
sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally
requires more than one "racketeering activity" and a threat of
continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity
plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern. S.Rep.
No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969). . . . Significantly, in defining "pat-
tern" in a later provision of the same bill Congress was more
enlightening: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events." 18 U.S.C. 3575(e). This language may be useful in in-
terpreting the other sections of the Act.44
As yet, there is no consensus as to what Justice White meant
regarding "continuity plus relationship." On the contrary, both
the district and circuit courts have radically split as to its mean-
ing. Courts do agree, however, that RICO's racketeering activity
language now requires "something more than merely two prior
acts . . . to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. The ques-
tions remains how much more." '45
III. RESTRICTING PATTERN TO SEPARATE CRIMINAL SCHEMES:
THE Inryco DECISION
Following the Sedima decision in the summer of 1985, statutory
interpretation of "pattern of racketeering activity" emerged as the
preeminent RICO issue. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v.
Inryco, Inc.;" was the first in a line of cases focusing on the
meaning of the concept of continuity noted by Justice White in
44. Id. at 496 n.14. (emphasis added to the sentence, "It is this factor of continuity
plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." Emphasis in original on "con-
tinuity plus relationship").
45. United States v. Friedman, 635 F. Supp. 782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified
on other grounds, 636 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But see Bankers Trust infra notes
99-109 and accompanying text.
46. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. I11. 1985). Inryco has been called "the most thorough
post-Sedima decision on the 'pattern' issue." Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 224
(N.D. III. 1985).
[Vol. 24
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Sedima's footnote 14. Inryco held this element of continuity of a
"pattern" is fulfilled by requiring that the predicate acts alleged
must have occurred in separate criminal schemes.47
In Inryco, Northern Trust alleged that a kickback scheme ex-
isted between a general and a sub-contractor on a constructionjob. In the RICO count, the complaint alleged the particulars of
the scheme and asserted as the requisite pattern of racketeering
activity including "two or more acts of mail fraud as hereinafter
described."4 8 The two acts described included several mailings in-
volved in connection with the subcontract including the mailing of
the subcontract and the mailing of the kickback check. On a mo-
tion to dismiss, the district court held that these two specified acts
were not enough to establish a "pattern of racketeering activity";
rather, they were simply part of the same fraudulent scheme.49
In dismissing the RICO count, Judge Shadur found that: "Both
logic and Sedima compel the conclusion that the two specified
acts [the mailing of the subcontract and the mailing of the kick-
back check] fail to establish a 'pattern of racketeering activity'. 50
He further observed that even though he need not decide the is-
sue, even if the three additional kickbacks involved the mail, they
implemented the same fraudulent scheme. 5 The "logic" referred
to by the Inryco court was a semantical construction of the term
"pattern":
True enough "pattern" connotes similarity, hence the cases'
proper emphasis on relatedness of the constituent acts ...[Plattern [also] connotes a multiplicity of events. Surely the
continuity inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal ac-
tivity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal
activity. It places a real strain on the language to speak of a
single fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts,
as a "pattern of racketeering activity. '5 2
Nonetheless, Judge Shadur's reasoning ran contrary to existing
authority. Two Seventh Circuit cases, and a Second Circuit case
were directly inapposite on the pattern issue. Each of the pre-
Sedima cases; United States v. Starnes,53 United States v. Weath-
erspoon,54 and United States v. Parness55 rejected the contention
47. Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 833.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 834.
51. Id. at 833.
52. Id. at 831. (emphasis in original).
53. 644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981) (single
arson with mail fraud sufficient).
54. 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) (multiple mailings used in fraudulent
operation of a Veteran's Administration supported school held sufficient).
55. 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
1988]
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that separate criminal events were a prerequisite to establishing a
pattern of racketeering activity and embraced the concept that a
pattern could be shown by criminal acts constituting a single
criminal transaction. Even though Judge Shadur recognized that
Justice White's language in Sedima's footnote 14 was dicta, he
took the remarkable step of holding that this same dicta "viti-
ated" the three prior appellate decisions which had broadly inter-
preted "pattern."5
Inryco's interpretation that a single scheme does not provide the
necessary continuity to constitute a pattern began to "cast doubt
on the continued validity of cases which carve one criminal epi-
sode into multiple predicate act 'pieces' and allege a 'pattern'." 7
As a result, the restrictive interpretation has become popular with
those courts which want to halt the growing use of RICO in com-
mercial cases.58 Recently though, both the Seventh 59 and Second60
56. Northern Trust, 615 F. Supp. at 834.
57. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
58. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1985) (sev-
eral acts of mail and wire fraud proved at trial in systematic fraud by defendants to steal
natural gas from pipeline, held to be only "isolated" fraudulent scheme insufficient to show
"pattern of racketeering activity"); Behunin v. Dow Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1387, 1390
(D. Colo. 1986) (alleged criminal activity in intentionally misrepresenting and marketing
defective brick and mortar compound constituted single scheme); Simon v. Fribourg, 650
F. Supp. 319 (D. Minn. 1986) (continuity element of pattern not shown in action by for-
mer employee against employer for promised participation in profit sharing plan); Mary-
land Nat'l Bank v. Dauphin Dep. Bank and Trust Co., 647 F. Supp. 908 (M.D. Pa. 1986)
(actions of one bank to induce another bank to become primary lender to insolvent cus-
tomer is not a pattern even though multiple predicate acts were present); McIntyre's Mini
Computer Sales Group v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(scheme to steal trade secrets is not a pattern); Eisenberg v. Spectex Indus., 644 F. Supp.
48 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (multiple mailings of false and misleading proxy and financial state-
ments did not constitute pattern in single scheme to seize control of corporation); Bosteve,
Ltd. v. Maraszkwi, 642 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y 1986) (no evidence that defendants en-
gaged in second scheme to defraud mandated JNOV on RICO verdict); Kronfield v. First
New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454 (D.N.J. 1986) (fraudulent misrepresentations
regarding marketing of bonds taking place all over the country and involving 1400 inves-
tors constituted a pattern); Wright v. Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co., 637 F. Supp. 155 (W.D.
Pa. 1986) (multiple mailings involved in alleged bad faith denial of insurance benefits were
only ministerial acts in execution of single scheme); Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 631
F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (multiple interrelated acts of wire and mail fraud
underlying securities law violations effecting transfer of limited partnership interest in sin-
gle piece of real estate did not show continuity); SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Co. v.
Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. I11. 1986) (RICO allegations against a defense contrac-
tor upheld where it was alleged that the contractor had made several malicious misrepre-
sentations regarding a competitor (plaintiff) to major customers, the Air Force and other
component suppliers-separate acts of fraud on various parties constituted a pattern); Fleet
Management Sys. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F. Supp. 550 (C.D. I11. 1986) (alle-
gations of numerous acts of wire and mail fraud in scheme to obtain and market under a
different name, a software program did not state a pattern); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F.
Supp. 474, 478 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("a 'pattern of racketeering activity' must include racke-
teering acts sufficiently unconnected in time or substance to warrant consideration of sepa-
rate criminal episodes."-each act of wire fraud-phone calls to Switzerland and the
Grand Cayman Islands and wiring of money to the islands-held part of the same criminal
10
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Circuits have expressly disapproved Inryco's rationale. Still, such
disapproval of the restrictive theory has not deterred other courts
in applying that interpretation, especially in the Eighth Circuit."'
The significance of the restrictive interpretation is that it repre-
sents a move by some federal courts to halt the spread of what
they see as a deluge of civil RICO actions. In the process, by re-
quiring different criminal schemes as a prerequisite for civil liabil-
ity, these courts have effectively over-criminalized civil RICO.
The central issue in the application of the restrictive interpretation
minimizes the actions directly relevant to the plaintiff's injury or
the continuity of a single activity occurring over a particular
length of time. The restrictive interpretation concentrates on the
ability of a plaintiff to allege, as part of a "pattern," other crimi-
nal behavior undertaken by the defendant.
For example, in Richter v. Sudman,62 it was alleged that the
transaction and not a "pattern").
This restrictive interpretation has ben adopted in courts across the country, especially in
the southern district of New York. See, e.g., Baum v. Phillips, Appel & Walden, Inc., 648
F. Supp. 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Savastano v. Thompson Medical Co., 640 F. Supp. 1081
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Ross v. Bolton, 639 F. Supp. 323, 328 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (RICO pattern
established when transaction sued upon was part of continuing series of illegal stock manip-
ulations aimed at different individuals); Richter v. Sudman, 634 F. Supp. 234, 238-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussed in text); Frankfurt Distrib. v. RMR Advertisers Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 1198 (S.D.N.Y 1986); Soper v. Simmons Int'l Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y
1986) (twenty predicate acts committed over a two year period involving at least three
different third parties did not constitute a pattern in single alleged scheme to deprive plain-
tiff of commission for bringing two defendant corporations together for commercial en-
deavor); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(multiple fraudulent acts occurring over eighteen months in churning scheme constituted
pattern); Crummere v. Brown, No. 85-1376, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 1986) (alle-
gations by individual investor that defendant's illegal wire transfers of her money, fraudu-
lent sale of her securities and conspiracy to commit the same held not to be a pat-
tern-these "multiple predicate acts" were simply a series of events necessary to complete
the single fraudulent scheme of diverting funds); But see Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman,
648 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y 1986); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheimer, Appel,
Dixon & Co., 629 F. Supp. 427, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
59. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Yoman, 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771
F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985).
60. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871(1980) and United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975).
61. The Eighth Circuit has firmly held to the rationale of Inryco and continues to
require multiple criminal schemes-either similar wrongful activity in the past or other
criminal activity elsewhere. See Deviries v. Prudental-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326,
329 (8th Cir. 1986); Holmberg v. Morrisette 800 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1986); Superior
Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986). Cases which recognize the Seventh
Circuit's disapproval of Inryco yet continue to apply the restrictive rationale include H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908, 914-16 (D. Minn. 1987); Behunin v.
Dow Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Colo. 1986), and Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover
Trust, 650 F. Supp. 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
62. 634 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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defendants had engaged in four separate but related schemes-
inducing thirteen investors to invest money in a commercial ven-
ture; inducing the investor to place their investment in an escrow
account; concealing defendants' premature withdrawal from that
account and further expending money from the account. The
court dismissed the RICO count because continuing criminal ac-
tivity had not been adequately pled:
[P]laintiffs have not alleged that the defendants have engaged in
similar schemes to defraud other investors, nor is there any evi-
dence that this particular scheme is on-going or continuous.
Once the defendants dispose of the investors' funds, the fraudu-
lent scheme comes to an end. There is no continuing threat of
criminal activity. In contrast, should the defendants again at-
tempt to raise money . . . through fraudulent means, there
would be evidence of a "pattern" along with evidence of a con-
tinuing threat of such untoward activity. 3
In searching for multiple schemes, courts, as in Richter, have
insisted on repeated organized criminal activity as part of "pat-
tern of racketeering activity." '64 These courts are now demanding
allegations focusing on the defendant's history and demanding ei-
ther that the defendants "had engaged in like [criminal] activities
in the past or that they were engaged in other criminal
activities."65
Thus in Richter, the court emphasized: "The fact that a single
activity may continue over a particular length of time does not
necessarily establish a pattern. The issue is not the continuity of a
single activity, but whether the defendants had a practice of en-
gaging in the same or similar types of activity." 6 Taken literally,
this insistence on continuing, separate criminal behavior implies
that no matter how sophisticated or lengthy a fraudulent scheme
may be, the remedial effect provided by Congress under RICO
will be denied an injured plaintiff because a single scheme is
involved.
63. Id. at 240.
64. Cf. Soper v. Simmons Int'l Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("[A]n isolated criminal episode, even if it is accomplished through a number of fraudulent
acts, neither evidences a threat of continuing criminal involvement nor the involvement of
an organized criminal enterprise.").
65. Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S.Ct. 1953 (1987). See also Deviries v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329
(8th Cir. 1986); Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co.,
641 F. Supp. 297, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Madden v. Gluck, 636 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Mo.
1986); Allright Mo. Inc. v. Billeter, 631 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
66. Richter, 634 F. Supp. at 238-39 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 24
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IV. MULTIPLE CRIMINAL EPISODES WITHIN A SINGLE SCHEME
MAY CONSTITUTE PATTERN
A. The Episodic and Open-Ended Single Scheme
Interpretation
The issue of whether a single prolonged scheme could constitute
a pattern quickly followed Inryco in Graham v. Slaughter.7 Gra-
ham involved a two year scheme by a shareholder in a closed cor-
poration of embezzling corporate funds. If the court had analyzed
the factual situation using Inryco's analysis, the facts would not
have constituted a pattern since the two year scheme involved but
a single victim and a single goal-the embezzlement of funds of a
single corporation over a period of time. The Graham court did,
however, find a pattern. Disagreeing with Inryco, Graham ques-
tioned whether the only way of establishing a patten of racketeer-
ing activity is through a showing of separate and distinct criminal
schemes.6 Instead, the court imposed a variation on Inryco's in-
sistence on separateness and viewed the two year practice of em-
bezzling as "an open-ended scheme,"6 9 concluding that this single
scheme included "a sufficient number of independent episodes to
satisfy the continuity factor of Sedima. ' 0
What emerged from Graham was a new formulation for deci-
phering when a pattern may be present-a pattern is more than a
single transaction, but not necessarily more than a single scheme.
Though this formula was certainly less rigid than Inryco's restric-
tive view, the Graham standard of episodic or transactional crimi-
nal events made up in vagueness what it lacked in rigidity. Specif-
ically, what characterized an "episode"? In Graham, for example,
great emphasis was placed on the fact that the scheme was "open-
ended", but what determines if a scheme is "open-ended"-is
there a set time frame in which an episodic fraud becomes a
pattern?
Two characteristics distinguishing an episode soon
evolved-length of time between the alleged transactions and the
existence of separate independent harm. Initially, Judge
Getzendenner in Graham defined an episode as a "transaction
somewhat separated in time and place" reflecting ongoing crimi-
nal activity.71 Then, in Heritage Insurance Co. v. First National
67. 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. III. 1986).
68. Id. at 224.
69. Id. at 225.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 224 (quoting United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn.
1975)).
19881
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Bank of Cicero,72 Judge Getzendenner added a second character-
istic which looked to the injury suffered. In Heritage, the alleged
scheme-a bank's fraudulent use of the mails and wires to convert
performance bond escrow accounts to retire a construction con-
tractor's debts owed to the bank-was perpetrated over a signifi-
cantly shorter period of time than in Graham, six months rather
than two years. In attempting to balance the relative brevity of
the scheme with the number of "episodes" involved, Judge
Getzendenner admitted that defining transactions as merely being
somewhat separated in time was not sufficient:
If one were to view the fraud as a single decision to misappropri-
ate escrow funds, the fact that the mailed escrow payments were
received over a six month period would probably not suffice to
transmute the unitary nature of the fraud into a "pattern of
racketeering. [However, in light of the fact that five separate
escrow agreements and four mailings took place] each alleged
mailing instigated a new diversion of funds and hence separate
injury."'5 3
Other courts have adopted similar characterizations, analyzing an
episode as having the identifying feature of "one basic injury" of
"independent harmful significance. '1 4
The issue has been how to characterize the defendant's criminal
behavior in such a way as to satisfy Sedima's elusive insistence on
"continuity." Inryco, and those courts adopting the restrictive in-
terpretation of pattern, stress the continuity of the enterprise itself
by requiring allegations that the defendant (as part of the enter-
prise) had a practice of engaging in criminal activity elsewhere. In
contrast, Graham's less restrictive moderate interpretation stresses
continuity, not of the enterprise, but of the enterprise's actions
within the scheme. Thus, under Graham and its progeny, "a sepa-
rate criminal episode is identified by a separate injury and at least
two episodes are needed for a pattern. 75
The moderate reading of pattern initiated in Graham has been
adopted by a number of courts 6 and may be evolving as a major-
72. 629 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
73. Id. at 1417. (emphasis added).
74. Ghouth v. Contincommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1336 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
75. Techreations, Inc. v. National Safety Council, 650 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. I11.
1986) (fraudulent inducement by mail and wire to enter into contract and subsequent mod-
ification of contract were not even two separate episodes, let alone two schemes).
76. See, e.g., NL Indus., Inc. v. Gulf & W. Indus., 650 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Kan.
1986) (commercial bribery, mail, wire and travel fraud insufficient to constitute a pattern
in action against competitor in alleged attempt to obtain one contract); Morris v. Gilbert,
649 F. Supp. 1491 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Lewis, On Behalf of Nat'l Semiconductor v. Sprock,
646 F. Supp. 574, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (individual mailings of fraudulent test data over a
three year period constitutes pattern); Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826 (D. Mass.
[Vol. 24
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ity view. What emerges from that interpretation, and is discussed
in detail below, is a trilateral view of the pattern involving predi-
cate acts, episodes and schemes:
Outline: Moderate and Restrictive Interpretations
"If the acts are merely ministerial
acts performed in the execution of
Predicate a single fraudulent transaction and
Acts not independently motivated crimes,
then they do not constitute a pattern."4(Graham v. Slaughter)
P Multiple Episodes/
A Single Scheme
T
TER Moderate Interpretation:
N Relevant factors include number and variety
of predicate acts involved and the length of time
F over which they were committed; the presenceF of separate schemes; number of victims; and
R the occurrence of distinct injuries.
A (e.g. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan)
C
K
E
T Separate Schemes
E
E
R
I Restrictive Interpretation:
N Did the defendant have the practice of
G engaging in the same or similar
criminal behavior either in the past or
presently elsewhere?
(e.g. Richter v. Sudman)
1986) (sufficient number of related episodes including calls, letters and personal assurances
continuing over time satisfied "continuity plus relationships" test in action brought against
stockbroker for fraudulent administration of investment accounts); Verges v. Babovich, 644
F. Supp. 150 (E.D. La. 1986) (series of parallel and independent frauds on number of
individuals by bank in collecting and demanding payment on promissory notes which were
procured by fraud constituted a pattern).
15
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1. Predicate Acts-Under the more moderate interpretation
applied by Graham and other courts, allegations of predicate acts,
no matter how numerous, are usually viewed as being mere minis-
terial acts if used in the execution of a single fraudulent transac-
tion. These courts recognize that while each separate predicate act
does indeed constitute a separate indictable criminal offense,77
that still is not enough to create a RICO violation. 8
2. Multiple Episodes/Single Scheme-Unlike the restrictive
separate schemes test, the middle approach recognizes that a sin-
gle scheme can, in certain circumstances, provide the requisite
continuity to establish a pattern. Two related issues emerge: how
to distinguish between predicate acts which are merely ministerial
to carrying out a single fraudulent scheme, and predicate act vio-
lations which are instrumental and thus constitute different fraud-
ulent episodes or transactions within the single scheme; and sec-
ondly, how to distinguish "isolated" and "sporadic" activity from
"continuous" activity?
Defining which circumstances will suffice to fulfill the pattern
requirement in an ongoing or single scheme situation has resulted
in the courts adopting a factually-oriented, case by case approach.
While some courts have stressed the presence of distinct injuries,"
others have emphasized that the predicate acts involved different
victims.80 Several courts have come out with approaches just as
Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118, 123 n.IA (D. Md. 1986)
also adopted a middle approach and set up a two tier analysis of pattern somewhat similar
to that ultimately put forward by the Seventh Circuit in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan,
615 F. Supp. 836 (N. I11. 1985). Under Temporaries' formula, the initial question is
whether more than one scheme is involved; if not, the question to be asked is whether an
open ended continuous scheme containing a multiplicity of predicate acts was involved. If a
single scheme is involved, then a number of factors need to be evaluated to determine the
continuous-rather than sporadic nature of the activity including. The factors indicating
continuity are: duration of the scheme; number of predicate acts involved; number of vic-
tims of such acts; likelihood that the scheme would continue indefinitely. In Temporaries, a
two month scheme involving numerous telephone calls was deemed as an isolated event and
not continuous in nature. Accord Anton Motors, Inc. v. Power, 644 F. Supp. (D. Md.
1986) (one scheme to defraud auto body shop by manager involving eight mailings and one
victim over a period of less than four months did not constitute a pattern).
77. See generally United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982); Saunders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621, 625 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970).
78. See, e.g., Medical Emergency Servs. v. Foulke, 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. I11.
1986) (each mailing does not necessarily create a separate criminal episode and is not
enough to qualify as a pattern.); In re Evening News Assoc. Tender Office Litigation, 642
F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (pattern "requires more than a single episode of
racketeering activity even if episode consists of more than one indictable act.").
79. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Verges v Babovich, 644 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. La. 1986). Cf. Pentcurelli
v. Spector Cohen Gadon & Rosen, 640 F. Supp. 868, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (accepting the
broad reading of pattern but also noting as important that other individuals were also the
16
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strict as Graham's but have explicitly refused to adopt a definition
of pattern which turns on an assessment of whether one or more
multiple criminal schemes are involved, finding that: "Such a defi-
nition would be highly susceptible to manipulative semantics." '81
These courts have steadfastly refused to adopt a "bright line test
in the abstract"8' 2 and have relied simply on an ad hoc approach
considering "the nature of the conduct under all the circum-
stances."83 At least one court has tried to resolve these questions
by insisting on not only multiple episodes but also requiring "from
the pleadings, a reasonable inference . . . that these episodes were
not an aberration in the way a defendant conducted his business.
Rather, the pattern made up of a multiple episodes must be a
regular part of the way a defendant does business and in that
sense, ongoing." '84
In Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan,8" the Seventh Circuit thor-
oughly reviewed the history of cases interpreting pattern. Morgan
involved an alleged scheme of a lender bank and promoters of a
commercial venture to divest plaintiffs of their initial cash invest-
ment and their home, which was put up as security for loans to
the venture. The alleged scheme continued over a four year period
and involved distinct acts of mail fraud-some which related to
the initial loan transaction and others of which related to two sep-
arate foreclosure sales regarding the collateral. At the district
court level, Judge Shadur, the author of Inryco, granted summary
judgment to the defendants because only a single fraudulent
scheme was involved. 88 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed.
The court described the conflict between the two views as a nat-
ural one: it requires reconciling the tension between two inherently
opposite ideas within any definition of pattern--"continuity" and
"relationship. 87 The court stated that requiring both elements as
victims of defendants' fraudulent inducements).
81. Paul S. Mullin & Assoc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986).
82. Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1987).
83. Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D.C. Colo. 1986), afd, 810
F.2d 925 (10th Cir 1987). Accord Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Say. & Loan, 639
F. Supp. 643, 650 (E.D. Va. 1986) (allegations that savings and loan foreclosed on prop-
erty, purchased property at auction and resold property in seven day period did not allege a
pattern).
84. Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1413 (N.D. I11. 1986) (multiple epi-
sodes found when defendants made false promises to induce plaintiff to invest in defend-
ant's partnership); Halstead Video, Inc. v. Gutillo 115 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. III. 1987) (multi-
ple episodes found where defendants skimmed monies from company by falsifying
documents, failing to report income and preparing false statement).
85. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
86. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 615 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. III. 1986), rev'd, 804
F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
87. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975.
1988]
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part of a pattern of racketeering activity "is a sound theoretical
concept that is not easily accomplished in practice." '88 The court
added:
This is because the terms "continuity and "relationship" are
somewhat at odds with one another. Relationship implies that
the predicate acts were committed somewhat in time to one an-
other, involve the same victim or involve the same type of mis-
conduct. Continuity, on the other hand, would embrace predi-
cate acts occurring at different points in time or involving
different victims. To focus excessively on either continuity or re-
lationship alone effectively negates the remaining prong.89
The Court of Appeals concluded (as had Judge Shadur in In-
ryco) that its own broad pre-Sedima interpretation in United
States v. Weatherspoon,90 holding that two predicate acts invaria-
ble constituted a pattern of racketeering activity, had lost its va-
lidity in light of Sedima.91 Nevertheless, the court rejected In-
ryco's restrictive separate schemes test because that test focused
too excessively on the continuity aspect of the pattern require-
mentf2 The court reasoned that the pitfall of such an excessive
focus leads to the "untenable result" of allowing defendants who
commit a large and ongoing single fraudulent scheme to automati-
cally escape RICO liability for their acts. 3
The Seventh Circuit in Morgan adopted a flexible middle ap-
proach similar to what was initiated in Graham. Predicate acts,
ongoing over a identified period of time were fairly viewed as sep-
arate transactions. In determining what adequately constitutes a
pattern of racketeering activity, the court laid down the following
guidelines:
Relevant factors [in making the pattern determination] include
the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time
over which they were committed, the number of victims, the
presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct inju-
ries. However, the mere fact that the predicate acts relate to the
same overall scheme or involve the same victim does not mean
that the acts automatically fail to meet the pattern requirement.
• . . [The determination of pattern] depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, with no one factor being
determinative."'
Under the Morgan analysis then, whether specific acts constitute
a pattern is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
91. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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3. Multiple Schemes-Courts adopting either the more mod-
erate interpretation under Graham or Inryco's restrictive view
have generally agreed that a "pattern" exists if there is more than
one scheme. However, in Morgan the court did note that the num-
ber of schemes alleged as just "one factor" to be measured when
evaluating whether there is sufficient continuity to constitute a
pattern. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that courts would fail to find a
pattern if faced with multiple schemes. The idea is that a scheme
"is more elaborate and complex than a criminal episode and since
multiple occurrences of the latter constitute a pattern, the a forti-
ori multiple occurrences of the former also do."'95
V. CASES REJECTING SEPARATE SCHEMES OR MULTIPLE
EPISODES
Unlike Inryco, Graham, and Morgan, a third line of post-
Sedima cases has emerged broadly reading RICO's pattern re-
quirement. These decisions have generally been critical of judi-
cially imposing categories of "schemes" and "episodes" as neces-
sary prerequisites for finding a pattern of racketeering activity.
The criticism has usually been on one or more of four grounds: 1)
courts have misread the meaning (and requirements) of footnote
14 in Sedima; 2) problems of vagueness and unpredictability are
inherent in the definition and application of the restrictive inter-
pretation; 3) that many of the pre-Sedima rulings broadly inter-
preting pattern have been left intact; and perhaps most impor-
tantly, 4) that by embellishing (and thereby narrowing the
application of RICO) courts have engaged in judicial legislation.
A. Interpreting the Meaning (and Requirements) of Footnote
14 in Sedima
Many cases rejecting the restrictive tests using multiple
schemes or episodes as characterizing a "pattern" have generally
allowed a RICO claim to proceed if two or more related predicate
acts are alleged.96 This liberal interpretation is consistent with
many pre-Sedima cases interpreting the pattern requirement. A
small number of courts, while not as liberal in applying the pat-
95. Techreations, Inc. v. National Safety Council, 650 F. Supp. 337, 339 (N.D. Il1.
1986). See also Ghouth v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 642 F. Supp. at 1337 (N.D. IIl
1986) ("if there is more than one scheme, a pattern would probably exist in most cases.");
But see Paul S. Mullin & Assoc., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986)
(taking a moderate approach to the pattern issue, but refusing to look at the pattern issue
in terms of "schemes" because the concept is "highly susceptible of semantical
manipulation").
96. See supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text.
1988]
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tern of racketeering activity requirement, have also rejected the
interpretative rules which delineate either "schemes" or "epi-
sodes" as proper tests for pattern.97 This second group of cases
attempts to satisfy Sedima by requiring indicia that the alleged
criminal activity exhibits some element of continuity or threat of
continuity.
1. The Related Acts Approach-Courts adopting a liberal or
more literal view of the pattern language maintain that those
cases which have applied an overly restrictive interpretation of
RICO's requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity have
misread both the RICO statute and Sedima. One judge has gone
even further, declaring that the restrictive cases which have extra-
polated an interpretation from footnote 14 in Sedima requiring
separate schemes or episodes "turn[s] the Supreme Court's rea-
soning on its head."9'
Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman99 best illustrates the related
acts approach.10 The case arose out of actions by the defendants
to conceal assets from creditors through a series of three alleged
acts of bankruptcy fraud and one act of bribery. The case was
dismissed in 1983 when the district court found that the plaintiff
had failed to allege any distinct RICO injury, as opposed to
merely a direct injury from the predicate acts. 101 The decision was
upheld by the Second Circuit'10 2 but then vacated by the Supreme
Court along with Sedima in 1985.103
On remand, defendants argued that the predicate acts alleged
did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the
post-Sedima decisions narrowing the application of RICO's pat-
tern requirement. The district court disagreed. In discussing the
development of the pattern requirement since the Sedima deci-
sion, the Bankers Trust Court criticized both the excessive reli-
ance which courts have placed on footnote 14's reference to con-
tinuity in Sedima, and the misinterpretation by the courts of
RICO's legislative history. As to Sedima's footnote 14, the court
stated:
[F]ootnote 14 simply is not a basis for the doctrine that has
arisen from it. The footnote makes no mention of multiple "epi-
97. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
98. Bush Dev. Corp. v. Harbour Place Assoc., 632 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D. Va.
1986).
99. 648 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
100. See also United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-92 (2d Cir. 1986).
101. Bankers Trust, 648 F. Supp. at 22.
102. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
103. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
[Vol. 24
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/3
INTERPRETING RICO
sodes," "transactions," or "schemes." The primary if not sole
focus of footnote 14 is on the need for a relationship between the
predicate acts which constitute a pattern. Thus, the Court
quotes 18 U.S.C. section 3575(e) (1982), which requires only a
connection between criminal acts.10 4
Regarding Sedima's reference to continuity, the court in Bank-
ers Trust, like Justice White in footnote 14, examined the stat-
ute's legislative history and concluded that two isolated acts of
racketeering by themselves do not constitute a pattern.10 5 In
Sedima, Justice White refers to Senate Report No. 91-617, but
only partially quotes one of the significant passages in that portion
of the legislative history: "The target of [RICO] is not sporadic
activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires
more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing
activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relation-
ship which combines to produce a pattern"'1 6 Nevertheless, in
that report, quoted at greater length in Bankers Trust, the con-
cept of pattern was discussed in a slightly broader context:
The concept of pattern is essential to the operation of the stat-
ute. One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought insuffi-
cient to trigger the remedies provided ...largely because the
net result would be too large and the remedies disproportionate
to the gravity of the offense. The target of [RICO] is not spo-
radic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally
requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the treat
[sic] of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern.10 7
Bankers Trust concluded that the continuity alluded to in the
Senate Report went to continuity among the predicate acts them-
selves: "It seems clear from this language that the continuity as-
pect is satisfied by the existence of a second predicate act, and
that the relationship aspect is satisfied by some connection be-
tween the acts."'0 8 Other courts accepting this broad interpreta-
tion have reached similar conclusions, specifically that the Court's
concern was directed not towards those situations "where the
racketeering acts are so closely related that they can be a part of
a single criminal episode" but towards those instances where two
isolated, sporadic or unrelated predicate acts are alleged to be a
pattern." 09
104. Bankers Trust, 648 F. Supp. at 25.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
107. Bankers Trust, 648 F. Supp. at 26. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Bush Develop. Corp. v. Harbour Place Assoc., 632 F. Supp. at 1366. See also
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In finding support for a broad interpretation of RICO's pattern
requirement, the courts have looked for support in both the lan-
guage of footnote 14, as well as the tenor of the entire Sedima
opinion. In Sedima, the Court cautioned against narrowly inter-
preting the RICO statute stating:
RICO is to be read broadly. This is not only the lesson of Con-
gress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach,
[citation omitted], but also of its express admonition that RICO
is to "be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes," Pub. L.
91-452 section 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. The statute's "remedial
purposes" are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a
private action for those injured by racketeering activity.'
Consistent with this language, some courts have taken a more lit-
eral approach to interpreting the pattern of racketeering activity
language in the RICO statute claiming that two or more related
predicate acts can constitute a pattern of racketeering."'
Brainerd & Bridges v. Weingeroff Enters., Inc., No. 85-C-493, slip op. (N.D. I1l. Sept. 18,
1986).
110. Sedima, 743 U.S. at 501.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that when a person commits at least two acts that have a common purpose of furthering a
continuing criminal enterprise with which the person is associated, Sedima's elements of
relatedness and continuity are satisfied); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350,
1355 (5th Cir 1985) (district court had not dealt with "pattern" issue, however Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that Sedima merely indicated that the two predicate acts need to be related; in
this case where defendants allegedly attempted to defraud the company by twice mailing it
false invoices regarding ownership and repair of certain equipment, the alleged acts of mail
fraud were related); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir.
1985) (each mailing in a scheme to defraud is a separate offense so that several separate
acts of mail fraud constitute a "pattern"); Bergen v. Rothschild, 648 F. Supp. 582, 590-91
(D.D.C. 1986) (stock churning case; mere predicate acts of securities fraud, mail fraud and
wire fraud may be sufficient to constitute pattern); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 648 F.
Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Winer v. Patterson, 644 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1986)
(stock churning case; literal application of § 1961(1,5)-two acts of racketeering activity
alleged a pattern); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Store Servs., 634 F. Supp. 1327, 1334
(W.D.N.C. 1986) ("[a]s long as more than one racketeering activity is sufficiently alleged,
a "pattern" . . . may exist even if the racketeering activities contemplate a single
scheme."); Bush Dev. Corp. v. Harbour Place Assoc., 632 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D. Va.
1986) (six separate but related acts of wire fraud involving only one victim and one scheme
or episode sufficient for a pattern); Cocan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp.
1167, 1170 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (plaintiff had alleged copyright infringement of its fictitious
character, Conan the Barbarian, adequately met pattern requirement pleading two related
and sufficiently particularized predicate acts arising out of the same scheme); First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 629 F. Supp. 427, 445 (S.D.N.Y
1985) (mailings of the same fraudulent information to two or more investors over several
days satisfies the pattern requirement); Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Wearne Brothers,
628 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. III. 1985) (allegations of at least two acts of mail and wire fraud
in furtherance of scheme to defraud plaintiffs and illegally obtain microcomputer technol-
ogy from them held to adequately alleged pattern); Systems Research, Inc. v. Random,
Inc, 614 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. II1. 1986) (kickback scheme where an employee of an employ-
ment agency was receiving a kickback for channeling applicants to an outsider-two al-
leged uses of mails and wires satisfies the pattern element).
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2. The "Threat of Continuing Activity" Cases (Continuity of
Predicate Acts)-Without fully embracing the requirement of
separate schemes or multiple episodes, some courts have adopted
variations encompassing some element of continuity.112 For exam-
ple, in Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association
v. Touche Ross & Co.,"13 decided by the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals early in 1986, a bank lent money on a project after
reviewing documents prepared by defendant, a major accounting
firm." '4 The commercial venture went bankrupt and the lender
bank sought to recover under RICO. The court found that nine
separate acts of wire and mail fraud used for the purpose of in-
ducing the bank to extend credit and involving the same parties
over a three year period were sufficient allegations to constitute a
pattern."15
Touche Ross focused on continuity by Justice White's reference
to 18 U.S.C. section 3575(e) in footnote 14, which states that
"criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces acts having the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events."" 6 Three factors were
considered important by the Touche Ross Court-the relationship
between the parties, the time frame of the predicate acts, and the
number of the predicate acts."17 Rather than analyzing the de-
fendants conduct in terms of episodes or schemes, the Eleventh
Circuit stressed "a threat of continuing activity" was the neces-
sary element under Sedima to determine a pattern." 8
Courts interpreting Touche Ross have analyzed it as impliedly
rejecting using schemes or episodes as determining factors for
finding a pattern and implying the less stringent requirement or
some factual indication of a threat of continuing activity." 9 The
112. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co.,
782 F.2d 966 (1Ith Cir. 1986); Lipin v. Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th
Cir. 1986) (acts to defraud one victim one time insufficient in absence of showing of other
victims or other frauds). Cf. Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987)
(continuity can not be scheme to accomplish merely one discrete goal or to continue after
that goal; court declines to "provide precise guidelines on this troublesome issue").
113. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
114. Civil RICO actions against accounting firms are becoming more frequent. See,
e.g., Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 1418,
1420-21 (W.D. Okla. 1985); Eastern Credit Corp. Fed. Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Mass. 1986); Pentcurelli v. Spector, Cohen, Gadon & Ro-
sen, 640 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
115. Touche Ross, 782 F.2d at 971.
116. Sedima, 473 U.S. 496 n.14.
117. Touche Ross, 782 F.2d at 969.
118. Id. at 971.
119. See, e.g., Sheftelman v. Jones, 636 F. Supp. 263, 268 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
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Ninth Circuit, in Sun Savings and Loan Association v.
Dierdorff,120 adopted an approach similar to that used by the
Eleventh Circuit in Touche Ross, and held that it is not necessary
to show more than one fraudulent scheme or criminal episode to
establish a pattern. Rather, using Touche Ross as a guide, the
court in Sun Savings held that a series of predicate acts can con-
stitute a pattern if the acts posed a threat of continuing activity.121
In Sun Savings, plaintiff, a savings institution, alleged that its
former president solicited -and received kickbacks from Sun's cus-
tomers who received large loans that he had approved. The RICO
allegations were premised on alleged violations of four predicate
acts of mail fraud based on four letters Dierdorff allegedly sent
government authorities in an attempt to coverup and deny his
wrongdoing. The district court in San Diego dismissed, holding
inter alia that the allegations failed to adequately allege a pattern
of racketeering activity. The Ninth Circuit reversed, criticizing
the restrictive interpretation typified by Inryco:
We are hard put to understand the significance of the seman-
tical distinction embodied in the Inryco district court's pro-
nouncement that RICO requires repeated criminal activity
rather than repeated criminal acts. The statement overlooks the
clear language of section 1961 stating that a pattern "requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity." RICO requires re-
peated acts, not repeated activity.122
The Ninth Circuit's criticism of the restrictive interpretation
was that while demanding a showing of predicate acts "sufficiently
unconnected" in time and substance might "make sense," that in-
terpretation places the continuity requirement in direct tension
with requiring a relationship between the predicate acts. The
court stressed that such an interpretation was neither supported
by either RICO's language nor Sedima.12' The court concluded
that the continuity requirement is aimed only at eliminating
RICO actions against perpetrators of isolated and sporadic acts
and "is not an attempt to limit RICO to complicated systems of
multiple schemes of criminal activity.1 24 Sun Savings thus held
that the four predicate acts alleged against the former president
posed a threat of continuing activity because they covered up a
whole series of alleged kickbacks and receipts of favors, occurred
over several months and in no way completed the criminal
120. 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987).
121. Id. at 194.
122. Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 193-94.
124. Id.
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scheme. 12 5
In Sun Savings, the Ninth Circuit stressed that the fact that
the last of a series of predicate acts may have completed the crim-
inal scheme does not necessarily preclude a finding of con-
tinuity.'26 As long as a threat of continuing activity exists at some
point during the racketeering activity, regardless of whether the
scheme is completed, the continuity requirement is satisfied.1 2 7
Sun Savings reaffirms the trend emerging in several decisions
which have applied the threat of continuing activity ap-
proach-these courts consistently have found that the critical fac-
tor is a showing of "temporal separateness and relatedness" dem-
onstrating repetition of the predicate acts over a protracted period
of time. 28 How much time, and how many acts are necessary to
adequately allege a pattern will be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 29
B. Vagueness and Unpredictability of the Restrictive
Interpretations
Some courts, including Bankers Trust, have criticized the re-
strictive interpretations of pattern because the tests-using judi-
cially imposed concepts of schemes and episodes-are inherently
vague and unpredictably applied. 130 At least one court has likened
125. Id. at 194.
126. Id. at 194 n.5.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Id.; Medallion Television Enter. Inc. v. Select-T.V. of California, Inc.,
No. 86-5595, slip. op. (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1987) ("[rlather than attempting to distinguish
between single 'episodes' or 'schemes' that may be a pattern, and single 'events' or 'transac-
tions' that may not, we prefer to frame the inquiry as whether the acts are isolated or
sporadic, on the one hand, or whether they indicate a threat of continuing activity.");
United States v. Freshie, 639 F. Supp. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (the continuity require-
ment means "there must be racketeering activity over a substantial period of time which
when combined with the relatedness requirement form a group distinguishable in composi-
tion."). Cf. Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (numerous predi-
cate acts committed over a fairly short period of time, relating to the same victim and the
same scheme does not satisfy continuity).
129. No case has yet decided if, under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, two related
predicate acts committed in a single scheme over a period can by themselves be enough to
fulfill the threat of continuity requirement. Courts within that circuit have implied that
such allegations, if properly pled, could constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. See,
e.g., Banco de DeSarrollo Agropecuario v. Gibbs, 640 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (requiring allegations of two acts of racketeering activity with enough specificity to
show that there is probable cause the crimes were committed). On the other hand, in
Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986),
two predicate acts involved in a scheme to divert goods were held not to pose a threat of
continuing activity because they furthered the diversion of only a single shipment of goods
and were alleged to have occurred at nearly the same time; "once those acts were com-
pleted, defendant had no further need to commit predicate acts."
130. See, e.g., Brainerd & Bridges v. Weingeroff Enters., Inc., No. 85-C-493, slip.
op. (N.D. I1l. Sept. 18, 1986); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 648 F. Supp. 17, 26
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the restrictive interpretation to the famous definition of obscen-
ity-"I know it when I see it"-that Justice Stewart set forth in
his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio.131
Judge Grady of the Northern District of Illinois best articulated
these criticisms in Brainerd & Bridges v. Weingeroff Enterprises
Inc.,132 where he compared a dozen cases which applied either the
Inryco or Graham approach. He concluded that there was no dis-
cernible line of reasoning leading to any consistency in some, but
not others, finding a pattern. 33 Equally important, as pointed out
in Brainerd, is that in applying these concepts, courts are tying to
sketch a variety of ambiguous and vague characteristics of a pat-
tern in an effort to read into Sedima a judicial limitation on the
statutory definition of pattern of racketeering activity. As stated
in Brainerd, the result is chaos:
How does one go about determining whether a fraud is "system-
atic" or "sporadic"? If a distributor falsified delivery receipts in
January and again in March, is that systematic or sporadic? If
it falsifies receipts from January through February, is it system-
atic because it is continuous? But then if it is continuous, then is
it just one episode?'"
Since Brainerd, some of the chaos (at least in the Seventh Cir-
cuit) has been resolved. The inconsistencies involved in the deci-
sion making process employing any of the restrictive forms of in-
terpretation-whether to look at the number of victims, the
presence of distinct injury, or the number of schemes-have been
thrown together into a judicial hodgepodge by Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan. The lower courts are now allowed to consider all of
these factors, with no one factor being determinative. To some ex-
tent then, the chaos has been organized. For those courts outside
the Seventh Circuit still using Inryco's or Grahams's restrictive
approaches, categorizing which behavior falls into a criminal
"scheme" or "episode" continues to be decided on an ad hoc basis.
A second criticism of the restrictive interpretation questions
whether judicially construing the statute as requiring a showing of
separate "schemes" raises constitutional defects. The pre-Sedima
concept of "pattern of racketeering activity" held that the lan-
guage was clearly defined as involving two or more related acts of
racketeering activity; this literal reading of the statute has been
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). Accord United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 n.15 (2d Cir.
1986).
131. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)(cited in Brainerd & Bridges v. Weingeroff Enters.,
Inc., No. 85-C-493, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1986)).
132. Brainerd & Bridges No. 85-C-493, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1986).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 16-17.
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repeatedly upheld as not being unconstitutionally vague.135 In
sharp contrast to the present trend, the pre-Sedima courts balked
at the idea of requiring separate schemes. For example, in United
States v. Weatherspoon,3 6 the court was confronted with the then
"novel" suggestion, later adopted in Inryco, that proof of a pat-
tern of racketeering activity required a showing that the criminal
defendant had engaged in multiple separate schemes. In dicta, the
Seventh Circuit noted that if such a definition were adopted, seri-
ous questions would arise as to the constitutionality of the stat-
ute. 3 7 Weatherspoon went on to point out that in order to save
the RICO statute from "void for vagueness" attacks, courts have
required that the predicate acts be related with the affairs of the
enterprise.1 38 Since re-emergence after Sedima of the separate
schemes test, at least one court has again raised, in dicta, Weath-
erspoon's concern for the constitutionality of using that interpre-
tation.3 9 The issue remains undecided.
C. The pre-Sedima Cases Broadly Interpreting Pattern May
Still be Good Law
Some post-Sedima cases confronting the pattern issue have ex-
pressly relied on pre-Sedima decisions to support a broad interpre-
tation of the RICO statute. Two lines of cases in particular have
been discussed as having continued validity: United States v.
Weatherspoon and its progeny, 4 ° holding that so long as at least
two or more related acts are proven, a pattern can exist, and
United States v. Starnes,14' where the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
its holding in Weatherspoon and added: "[T]he fact that there is
but one objective under the separate acts does not diminish the
135. See, e.g., United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1980) (clearly
defined as at least two acts of racketeering activity); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 30,
441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (pattern is expressly defined as two
or more predicate acts); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y 1973)
(not vague since predicate offenses clearly defined), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
136. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
137. Id. at 601.
138. Id. at 601 n.2.
139. Brainerd & Bridges, No. 85-C-493, slip op. at 18.
140. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978). See
also Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
("[e]ach act of criminal activity is counted as an act of racketeering activity, even if nu-
merous acts arise out of the same episode.").
141. 644 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981). See also
United States v. Choveanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (single objective to defraud
single victim constituted RICO offense when carried out through multiple incidents of wire
fraud).
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applicability of RICO to those acts."' 42
Volckmann v. Edwards, 143 best illustrates the rationale for the
continued validity of these pre-Sedima decisions. In Volckmann,
approximately two dozen plaintiffs sued under RICO alleging that
they were induced to purchase partnership interests by misrepre-
sentations in the partnership offerings and the promoter's oral
misrepresentations. On motion to dismiss, defendants argued that
the allegations failed to establish a "patten of racketeering" under
RICO because the predicate acts of various mail and wire frauds
involving the misrepresentations were so intimately related among
themselves as to constitute a single course of conduct.1
44
However, the court refused to follow Inryco's insistence that a
pattern of racketeering activity required a showing of separate
schemes. 45 Instead, the court pointed out that the concept of con-
tinuity noted in footnote 14 in Sedima and Inryco's requirement
of separate and distinct schemes as a prerequisite for a pattern
represent "opposite ends of a continuum."'1 46 Rather than ac-
cepting the Inryco line of authority, Volckmann embraced Weath-
erspoon's liberal approach towards finding a pattern and found
the requisite continuity demanded by Sedima present in the alle-
gations of multiple predicate offenses:
[I]f Sedima only deals with the "continuity" requirement, is it
fair to say that the decision by implication vitiates all prior hold-
ings dealing with the separateness requirement?
It is true that Sedima admonishes "Congress and the courts
to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern'." [citations omit-
ted]. That admonition, however, alludes to the suggestion in
footnote 14 concerning the continuity requirement, which itself
establishes a meaningful concept of pattern. It does not say any-
thing with regard to the other end of the continuum-the "sepa-
rateness" requirement. In the absence of any such reference, it
must be presumed that the Court did not mean to overturn the
Weatherspoon line of authority.147
The test applied by the Volckmann court, consistent with Weath-
erspoon was simply that if the defendants could theoretically have
been indicted on multiple counts of mail or securities fraud in con-
nection with the allegedly fraudulent sales, the requisite continuity
for pattern was sufficiently alleged. 148
142. Starnes, 644 F.2d at 678.
143. 642 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
144. Id. at 111.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 113.
147. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 115.
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Even if the Supreme Court "did not mean to overturn the
Weatherspoon line of authority," as Volckmann maintained, 49
the Seventh Circuit ultimately disapproved of Weatherspoon in
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan.15 0 However, Morgan's disapproval
is a limited one, going only to the extent that Weatherspoon pro-
claimed that two predicate acts "invariably constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity."' 5' Despite Morgan's disapproval, courts
outside the Seventh Circuit still follow the basic premise of
Weatherspoon and Starnes'52 that a pattern can exist where there
is one criminal objective which employs two or more related predi-
cate criminal acts. 53 Arguably, footnote 14's admonition against
isolated and sporadic racketeering activity in Sedima requires
nothing more.154
D. Judicial Legislation
In Sedima, both the majority and minority opinions noted the
broad application of civil RICO lawsuits against legitimate enter-
prises in commercial fraud actions. Justice White, writing for the
majority, recognized that civil "RICO is evolving into something
quite different from the original conception of its enactors. ' ' 1c
Still, as the Court noted, civil RICO's expansive use is inherent in
the way the statute is written and that if broadness is a defect in
the statute, "its correction must lie with Congress."' 56 The major-
ity opinion in Sedima went on to stress that for the lower courts to
impose "amphormous standing requirements [i.e., a prior criminal
conviction of the defendants, or specific RICO-type injury] as did
the Second Circuit in the Sedima case, neither effectively re-
sponds to these problems nor is it an appropriate form of statutory
149. Id. at 114.
150. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text for discussion of Morgan.
151. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d at 975.
152. Morgan was decided after Volckmann. Morgan's disapproval of Weatherspoon
was carefully limited; no mention was made in the opinion to Starnes' which allows a
single criminal objective to constitute a pattern, and Starnes apparently remains good law.
153. See, e.g., Moravian Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 651 F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (following Starnes); Penteurelli v. Spector, Cohen, Gadon & Rosen, 640 F.
Supp. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Compare with district courts within the Seventh Circuit rely-
ing on Weatherspoon prior to its disapproval in Morgan. See generally Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 647 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Il. 1986).
154. Cf. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 647 F. Supp. 1026.,
1031 (N.D. Il. 1986) ("a number of mailings, fraudulent within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341, in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, constitute a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity."); Bankers Trust, 648 F. Supp. at 25 ("[t]he primary if not sole focus of footnote 14 is
on the need for some relationship between the predicate acts constituting a pattern.").
155. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
156. Id.
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amendment undertaken by the courts."' 7
Nevertheless, the judicial hostility towards the growing use of
civil RICO has been dramatic. Fearing erosion of the distinct stat-
utory requirements conferring federal jurisdiction, an overburden-
ing of the federal courts, and an usurpation of state court author-
ity over routine contract and fraud matters, the Judicial
Conference of the United States has suggested to Congress that it
"should seriously consider narrowing" the reach of the civil RICO
statute.158 By embellishing the statute far beyond the statutory re-
quirement, the restrictive decisions have effectively narrowed the
use of civil RICO.159 On the other end of the spectrum are the
post-Sedima decisions which have continued to interpret the pat-
tern requirement broadly. These decisions have accused those
courts imposing restrictive requirements on to the statute as en-
gaging in a blatant form of judicial legislation.
The basis of this criticism again focuses on the statute itself and
RICO's legislative history. The interpretations engrafting require-
ments of demonstrating other criminal schemes or multiple crimi-
nal episodes have "[l]ike previous efforts to limit RICO's scope
ignore[d] the statute's plain language."' 6 While the statute refers
to "acts" two or more which must be "related" and in "con-
tinuity" to constitute a pattern,' 6' neither RICO nor its legislative
history in discussing the pattern language mentions schemes or
episodes. As pointed out in Volckmann, those courts and other au-
thorities which urge such a construction have offered "not a speck
of legislative history to support the separateness requirement."' 62
The argument against imposing requirements beyond the stat-
157. Id.
158. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, 11-12 (March 11-12, 1986).
159. This is most dramatically illustrated by cases involving virtually the same fac-
tual allegations yet resulting in opposite holdings depending on which interpretation of pat-
tern was followed, For example, Behunin v. Dow. Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D.
Colo. 1986) and Moravian Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 651 F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D. Pa.
1986) both involved RICO claims against the manufacturer of an alleged defective brick
and mortar compound ("Sarabond") which was marketed using allegedly intentional mis-
representations involving mail and wire fraud. In Behunin, the court used the restrictive
approach under Inryco and held that the allegation of multiple mail constituted single
scheme. In Moravian, the broader test was used and a pattern or racketeering activity was
held to have been adequately alleged.
160, Brainerd & Bridges v. Weingeroff Enters., Inc., No. 85-C-493, slip. op. (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 18, 1986).
161. Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Store Servs., 634 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D.N.C.
1986); Federal Dep. Ins. Corp. v. Kerr, 637 F. Supp. 828, 835 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
162. Volckmann, 642 F. Supp. at 114. The other authorities referred to include the
American Bar Association's Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force which has recommended that
Congress include a requirement of separate schemes. See Report of the Ad Hoc Civil
RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporations, Banking and Business Law 208
(1985).
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ute and its legislative history is simple-by restricting the inter-
pretation of pattern of racketeering activity, the courts have, in
principle, returned to the criminal conviction and racketeering in-
jury requirements rejected by the court in Sedima.16 3 While these
additional requirements might well effectively curtail the use of
civil RICO, their creation, "absent explicit support in the legisla-
tive history, constitutes a form of statutory amendment reserved
for Congress."164
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Sedima left it to the lower courts to
fashion a workable definition of the pattern requirement, but gave
little guidance as to the form such a definition should take. Not
surprisingly, the diverse and often antagonistic results discussed in
this article have arisen. Each approach, of course, has its
problems.
The multiple schemes approach, notwithstanding its possible
constitutional infirmities, presents certain practical problems. Re-
quiring evidence of multiple criminal schemes imposes almost in-
surmountable obstacles of both pleading and proof of the plain-
tiff's case. In many cases, evidence of other schemes would usually
be in the possession of the defendant and would come out, if at all,
during discovery. To expect a plaintiff to be in a well founded
position to plead specific allegations of frauds involving third par-
ties may be unreasonable in many cases."' 5
The more moderate approach of Morgan, while attempting to
balance all competing factors is too factually oriented and unpre-
dictable. It further exposes the application of the pattern of racke-
teering activity requirement to possible constitutional vagueness
defects. Also, the Morgan approach engrafts on to the RICO stat-
ute prerequisites that are neither statutorily required nor man-
dated by Sedima. The Supreme Court in Sedima rejected both an
organized crime nexus or a prior criminal conviction as prerequi-
sites for civil RICO actions. It makes little sense for the lower
163. Bush Dev. Corp. v. Harbour Place Assoc., 632 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D. Va.
1986).
164. Volckmann, 642 F. Supp. at 115.
165. This is best illustrated in B.J. Skin & Nail Care v. International Cosmetic
Exch., 641 F. Supp. 563, 567 n.7 (D. Conn. 1986) (acts of mail fraud occurring over a
three month period did not constitute pattern under either the separate scheme analysis or
the flexible approach. The court reminded counsel of the threat of Rule I I sanctions in the
event an amended complaint was not well grounded in law and fact, after it had dismissed
plaintiff's complaint because plaintiff was unable to allege multiple criminal episodes. The
dismissal was granted despite plaintiff's protestations regarding defendant's opposition to
the plaintiff's requested discovery concerning that very issue).
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courts to resurrect these theories in the guise of interpreting pat-
tern of racketeering activity.
The liberal interpretation of pattern requiring at least two re-
lated predicate acts seems to be most in line with congressional
intent and a reasonable reading of Sedima. The RICO statute
made it a separate crime for engaging in a pattern for racketeer-
ing activity and the civil component of that statute allows those
injured by such a pattern to recover for injuries to their business
or property. By requiring that racketeering acts have a connection
with one another by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to
constitute a pattern, the broad interpretation fulfills the "con-
tinuity plus relationship" elements suggested by Justice White in
footnote 14. A broad definition of pattern allows civil RICO a po-
tentially wide application for combatting fraudulent behavior in
the commercial setting. Still, as the Supreme Court in Sedima
recognized, those engaged in legitimate commercial enterprises
have no inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity
from its consequences. 66 RICO was designed as "an aggressive
initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods of
fighting crime.167 The statute should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with that legislative intent.
166. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
167. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
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